I. INTRODCUTION
The judicialization of politics -the reliance on courts and judicial means for addressing core moral predicaments, public policy questions, and political controversies -is arguably one of the most significant phenomena of late twentieth and early twenty-first century government. Armed with newly acquired judicial review procedures, national high courts worldwide have been frequently asked to resolve a range of issues, varying from the scope of expression and religious liberties, equality rights, privacy, and reproductive freedoms, to public policies pertaining to criminal justice, property, trade and commerce, education, immigration, labor, and environmental protection. Bold newspaper headlines reporting on landmark court rulings concerning hotly contested issues -same sex marriage, limits on campaign financing, and affirmative action, to give a few examples -have become a common phenomenon. This is evident in the United States, where the legacy of active judicial review recently marked its bicentennial anniversary; here, courts have long played a significant role in policy-making. And it is just as evident in younger constitutional democracies that have established active judicial review mechanisms only in the last few decades. Meanwhile, transnational tribunals have become main loci for coordinating policies at the global or regional level, from trade and monetary issues to labor standards and environmental regulations.
While several scholars have identified a decline in the political salience of the United States Supreme Court (e.g. Schauer 2006) , the global expansion of judicial power has marched on. In recent years, the judicialization of politics has expanded beyond flashy rights issues to encompass what we may term 'mega-politics' -matters of outright and utmost political significance that often define and divide whole polities. These range from electoral outcomes and corroboration of regime change to foundational collective identity questions, and nation-building processes pertaining to the very nature and definition of the body politic as such. Although many public policy matters still remain beyond the purview of the courts, there has been a growing legislative deference to the judiciary, an increasing and often welcomed intrusion of the judiciary into the prerogatives of legislatures and executives, and a corresponding acceleration of the judicialization of political agendas.
Together, these developments have helped to bring about a growing reliance on adjudicative means for clarifying and settling highly contentious political questions, and have transformed national high courts worldwide into major political decision-making bodies.
Despite the increasing relevance of this trend to the study of domestic and international law and politics, the literature addressing the judicialization of politics worldwide remains surprisingly sketchy. The term 'judicialization' suffers from analytical fuzziness; it is often used in an umbrella-like fashion to refer to different, if often interrelated, processes, ranging from judge-made policy-making to rights jurisprudence to debates over judicial appointments and the politicization of the judiciary -the inevitable flip side of judicialization. Relatively few works (e.g., Tate & Vallinder 1995; Goldstein et al. 2001; Hirschl 2002 Hirschl , 2004a Ferejohn 2002; Shapiro & Stone-Sweet 2002; Miller 2004; Pildes 2004; Sieder et al. 2005 ) go beyond single-country case studies to treat the judicialization of politics as a broad sociopolitical phenomenon. With a few notable exceptions, much of the pertinent literature seems not to recognize that the great judicialization train has long since left the 'rights jurisprudence' station. Some of this oversight stems from lack of a genuinely comparative perspective (Hirschl 2006) . Because the number of American scholars who work in the field still far exceeds the number of citizens of the rest of the world who study the same set of phenomena, American constitutional experience is still the main reference point for most pertinent studies published in leading academic venues. Consequently, the judicialization of politics continues to be portrayed as broadly synonymous with American-style rights jurisprudence and judicial activism. Although such an account might have been accurate as recently as the 1990s, it no longer captures the current scope of judicialized mega-politics.
In this article, I explore the scope and nature of the emerging new level of judicialized pure or mega-politics, as well as its main causes. I proceed in four stages. The next two sections define and illustrate the characteristics of the judicialization of megapolitics, and illustrate its various manifestations through recent examples drawn from jurisprudence of constitutional courts and tribunals worldwide. Next, I turn to explanatory factors. Works that attempt to explain (not merely describe) the judicialization of politics may be grouped, for the sake of simplicity, into four main categories: functionalist, rightscentered, institutionalist, or court-centered. None of these four approaches takes the conceptualization of courts as political institutions seriously enough. To complement these approaches, I advance here a more 'realist' judicialization-from-above account, which emphasizes support from the political sphere as a necessary precondition for judicialization of pure politics. To further illustrate this point, I survey patterns of political reaction to recurrent manifestations of unsolicited judicial intervention in the political sphere in general, and unwelcome judgments concerning contentious political issues in particular.
As I suggest in my concluding remarks, the strategic approach to judicialization illustrates the increasingly inexplicable divide between grand constitutional theory and the study of real-life constitutional law and politics.
II. WHAT IS THE JUDICIALIZATION OF MEGA-POLITICS?
The ascendancy of legal discourse and the popularization of legal jargon has become evident in virtually every aspect of modern life. It is perhaps best illustrated by the subordination of almost every decision-making forum in modern rule-of-law polities to quasi-judicial norms and procedures. Matters that had previously been negotiated in an informal or non-judicial fashion have now come to be dominated by legal rules and procedures. However, the judicialization of politics started much before what we may label The global convergence toward constitutional supremacy -a concept that have long been a major pillar of American political order and is now shared, in one form or another, by more than 100 countries across the globe -brought about an inevitable and often welcomed increase in the salience of constitutional courts worldwide. Today, not a single week passes without a national high court somewhere in the world releasing a major judgment pertaining to the scope of constitutional rights or the limits on legislative or executive powers. The most common are cases dealing with procedrual justice and criminal 'due process' rights. Aggregate data suggest that approximately two-thirds of all constitutional rights cases in the 'world of new constitutinalism' deal with that type of rights. Also common are rulings involving classic civil liberties, the right to privacy, and formal equality. This ever-expanding body of civil liberties jurisprudence has expanded and fortified the boundaries of the constitutionally protected private sphere (often perceived as threatened by the long arm of the state and its regulatory laws) and has transformed numerous policy areas involving individual freedoms.
In recent years we have seen the emergence of another level of judicialized politics: reliance on courts and judges for dealing with what we might call 'mega-politics' -core political controversies that define the boundaries of the collective or cut through the heart of entire nations. This level of judicialization includes several subcategories: judicial scrutiny of executive-branch prerogatives in the realms of macroeconomic planning or national security (i.e., the demise of what constitutional theorists call the 'political question' doctrine); judicialization of electoral processes; judicial corroboration of regime transformation; fundamental restorative-justice dilemmas; and above all, the judicialization of formative collective identity, nation-building processes, and struggles over the very definition or raison dêtre of the polity as such -arguably the most troubling type of judicialization from a participatory democracy stanpoint. These emerging areas of judicialized politics expand the boundaries of national high-court involvement in the political sphere beyond any previous limit.
Consider the judicialization of such core issues as the fate of the American presidency or the Mexican presidency, multicultural citizenship in Western Europe, the place of Germany in the EU, the war in Chechnya, the near-constant political turmoil in Pakistan, quandaries of transitional justice from the post-communist world to post-authoritarian Latin America to post-apartheid South Africa, the status of indigenous populations in Australia and New Zealand, the political future of Quebec and the Canadian federation, the eminence of Shari'a law in Egypt, 'who is a bumiputra?' ('authentic' Malay) and the boundaries of the collective in Malaysia, the secular nature of Turkey's political system, or Israel's fundamental definition as a 'Jewish and democratic state' and the corresponding question, 'Who is a Jew?' These diverse matters have all been framed as constitutional issues, with the concomitant assumption that courts -not politicians or the public -should resolve them. Aharon Barak, the former proactive president of the Supreme Court of Israel, once said that "nothing falls beyond the purview of judicial review; the world is filled with law; anything and everything is justiciable," and it seems that this motto has become widely accepted by courts worldwide.
It is difficult to overstate the significance of this transition. Whereas oversight of the procedural aspects of the democratic process -judicial monitoring of electoral procedures and regulations, for example -falls within the mandate of most constitutional courts, questions such as a regime's legitimacy, a nation's collective identity, or a polity's coming to terms with unsavory episodes in its past, primarily reflect deep political dilemmas, not judicial ones. As such, they ought -at least in principle -to be contemplated and decided by the populace itself, through its elected and accountable representatives. Adjudicating such matters is an inherently and substantively political exercise that extends beyond the application of rights provisions or basic procedural justice norms. Judicialization of this type involves instances where a nation's courts decide its watershed political issues -even those not directly addressed by its constitution -despite the obvious recognition of the very high political stakes for the nation. It is precisely these instances of the judicialization of core political issues that make the democratic credentials of judicial review most questionable. Whereas courts may be a suitable setting -perhaps even the best one, both in terms of the their institutional position in a democracy and in terms of the judges' expertise -for assessing evidence, determining responsibility for alleged wrongdoing, or for dealing with matters of procedural justice and fairness, it is unltimately unclear what makes courts an appropriate forum for deciding what are quandaries of a purely and substantively political nature.
The distinction between 'ordinary' instances of judicialization and the judicialization of 'mega-politics' depends, in part, on our conceptualization of the political. A political decision must affect the lives of many people -but many cases that are not purely political (e.g., large class-action lawsuits) also affect the lives of many people. Because there is no simple answer to the question "what is political?" -for some social theorists, the answer to that question would be "everything" -there can be no plain and simple definition of the judicialization of politics, either. And there are other complications. A controversial political issue in one polity (say, affirmative action in the United States) may be a nonissue in another polity. And different polities may have very different views of a single issue.
For example, reproductive freedom may be framed mainly as a clash of rights (e.g., in the United States), as reflection of the status of the historically influential church (e.g., in Colombia), or as a conflict between national preferences and supranational norms (e.g., the compatibility of Irish abortion laws with provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights).
But regardless of how one defines the boundaries of the political, there seems to be little doubt that a landmark court judgment determining the political fate of voters, leaders and parties, the legitimacy of a polity's regime, the forms of transitional justice, or a nation's collective identity is a ruling with an explicit and utomost political salience. Few issues may be considered more 'political' than those that authoritatively define a polity's very identity, such as the status of Quebec and the Canadian confederation, the place of Germans in the Eurepean demos, or the 'who is a Jew?' question in Israel. This elusive yet intuitive category of 'existential' national issues is what differentiates the judicialization of mega-politics from other levels of judicialization.
III. A FEW ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
The judicialization of mega-politics includes several types of issues and controversies. For the sake of simplicity, these will be grouped here into five categories.
(i) Electoral processes and outcomes
Arguably,the most overtly political area is the judicialization of the democratic process itself. The U.S. Supreme Court's rullings in matters such as campaign financing, gerrymandering, and the redrawing of electoral districts are probbaly well known to the readers (see, e.g., Issacharoff et al. 2007 ). North of the border, the Supreme Court of Canada has also been active with respect to the law of democracy -from extending voting rights to prisoners (Sauvé 2002) The shadow of the Pinochet era continued to haunt Chile's political system for years after his retirement. Courts in Chile and elsewhere became the main forum for dealing with the aftermath of his ruthless dictatorship. Arguably the epitome of this kind of judicialization was seen in the early post-apartheid years in South Africa: The 'amnestyfor-confession' formula had been given a green light by the South African Constitutional Court in AZAPO (1996) , allowing the establishment of the quasi-judicial Truth and Reconciliation Commission. With that court ruling, the possibility of a radical redistribution of wealth, not merely symbolic self-purification, in one of the most unequal polities on earth was finally put to rest.
(v) Defining the nation via courts
The clearest manifestation of the judicialization of core political controversies -arguably the type of judicialization of politics that is the hardest to reconcile with canonical constitutional theory concerning the position of courts in a democracy -is the growing It is dispersed around the world, in communities. Whoever converted to Judaism in one of these communities overseas has joined the Jewish nation by so doing, and is to be seen as a 'Jew' under the Law of Return. This can encourage immigration to Israel and maintain the unity of the Jewish nation in the Diaspora and in Israel." Recall that this was supposed to be a court ruling, not a political speech or manifesto.
On the matter of Jewishness and related topics, the Court delivered the goods for its largely secular-nationalist proponents. Over the past two decades, it has pursued a distinctly liberalizing agenda in core matters of religion and state. At the same time, it has also protected the 'Jewishness' pillar of the state's collective identity. In a landmark ruling As we have seen, the wave of judicial activism that has swept the globe in recent decades has engulfed the most fundamental issues a democratic polity ought to address.
Although foundational political questions of this nature may have important constitutional aspects, they are not purely, nor even primarily, legal dilemmas. Therefore one would think they ought to be resolved, at least in principle, through public deliberation in the political sphere. Nonetheless, constitutional courts throughout the world have become major decision-making bodies for dealing with precisely such dilemmas. Fundamental restorative justice, regime legitimacy, and collective-identity questions have been framed in terms of constitutional claims, and as such, have rapidly found their way to the courts.
IV. WHY THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS?
Akin any other major socio-legal phenomenon, the judicialization of politics across a wide spectrum results from a confluence of factors rather than any single cause. Works that attempt to explain (not merely describe) the judicialization of politics may be grouped, for the sake of simplicity, into four main categories: functionalist, rights-centered, institutionalist, or court-centered. The functionalist approach attributes the judicialization of recent decades to the proliferation in levels of government and the corresponding emergence of a wide variety of semi-autonomous administrative and regulatory state agencies (Shapiro & Stone-Sweet 2002) . According to this approach, independent and active judiciaries armed with judicial-review practices are necessary for the efficient monitoring of the ever-expanding administrative state. Moreover, the modern administrative state embodies notions of government as an active policy maker rather than a passive adjudicator of conflicts. It therefore requires an active, policy-making judiciary (Feeley & Rubin 1998) . Along the same lines, the judicialization of politics may also stem from the increasing complexity and contingency of modern societies (Luhmann 1985) and/or from the creation and expansion of the modern welfare state with its numerous regulatory agencies (Teubner 1987 , Habermas 1988 . Some accounts of the rapid growth of judicialization at the supranational judicial level portray it as an inevitable institutional response to complex coordination problems deriving from the systemic need to adopt standardized legal norms and administrative regulations across member-states in an era of converging economic markets (Stone-Sweet 2000). In some instances, economic liberalization may be an important projudicialization factor. In the regulatory arena, the combination of privatization and liberalization may encourage 'juridical regulation' (Vogel 1998 , Kelemen & Sibbitt 2004 .
The second approach emphasizes the prevalence of rights discourse or the greater awareness of rights issues, which is both reflective of and contributing to what may be termed 'judicialization from below.' An authentic, 'bottom up' judicialization is more likely when judicial institutions are perceived by social movements, interest groups, and political activists as more reputable, impartial, and effective decision-making bodies than other institutions, which are viewed as bureaucracy-heavy or biased (Tate & Vallinder 1995) . Judicialization of this kind relies on a perceived contrast between the relative openness and integrity of the judicial process and the corruptibility of political bargaining (Scheingold 1974) . A well-developed support structure for legal mobilization may aid this kind of judicialization by allowing historically under-represented or disenfranchised groups and individuals to invoke potentially favorable laws and constitutional provisions through strategic litigation (Epp 1998) .
A third approach emphasizes institutional features that are, ceteris paribus, hospitable to judicialization. At a bare minimum, the judicialization of politics requires acceptance of the rule of law, some level of legitimacy of the legal system, and a relatively independent and well-respected apex court armed with some form of judicial-review power. Hence, the proliferation of democracy worldwide is said to be a main cause of judicialization and the expansion of judicial power more generally. By its very nature, the establishment of a democratic regime entails some form of separation of powers among the major branches of government, as well as between the central and provincial/regional legislatures. It also entails setting up procedural governing rules and decision-making processes to which all political actors are required to adhere. The persistence and stability of such a system requires at least a semiautonomous, supposedly apolitical judiciary to serve as an impartial umpire in disputes concerning the scope and nature of the fundamental rules of the political game. Active judicial review is both a prerequisite and a byproduct of viable democratic governance in multi-layered federalist countries (Shapiro 1999) . In other words, more democracy equals more courts. However, the 'proliferation of democracy' thesis cannot account for the judicialization of politics in non-or quasi-democratic polities, nor account for significant variations in levels of judicialization among new democracies. And it does not adequately explain increased levels of judicialization in stable democracies with no apparent changes in their political regime.
An institutional catalyst for judicialization is provided by the proliferation of courts and tribunals at the supranational level (Romano 1999 , Slaughter 2000 , Goldstein et al. 2001 ). Perhaps nowhere is this process more evident than in Europe (e.g., Models of judicial review employed by constitutional democracies vary in their procedural characteristics. This variance is said to have implications for the scope and nature of judicial review in these countries. A system that permits a priori and abstract review initiated by politicians (e.g., France), unlike a system that permits only a posteriori and concrete judicial review (e.g., the United States), would appear to have a greater potential for judicialized policy making using the process of constitutional review.
However, as scholars have correctly pointed out, "the apparently more restrictive combination of a posteriori and concrete review has hardly relegated the US Supreme Court to a minor policy role" (Tate 1992, p. 6) . Likewise, the impact of the judiciary on public policy outcomes is said to be more significant under a decentralized, all-court review system (e.g., the United States) than under a centralized, single-tribunal The fourth perspective holds that the courts and judges are the main driving force behind the expansion of judicial power. This court-centric approach is often advanced by scholars of supranational judicial organs (e.g., Weiler 1994 , Mattli & Slaughter 1995 , Alter 2001 , Oliveira 2007 . It is shared by constitutional theorists who often treat unelected justices as seizing power from elected officials, thereby illustrating the so-called countermajoritarian difficulty, or the tension between democratic governing principles and judicial review. Even politically astute critics of judicial activism, both leftists and conservatives, often accuse 'power hungry' judges and 'imperialist' courts of expropriating the constitution, being too assertive or overinvolved in moral and political decision making, and thus disregarding fundamental principles of separation of powers and democratic governance (Tushnet 1999 , Bork 2002 , Kramer 2004 , Waldron 2006 ).
None of these four approaches takes the conceptualization of courts as political institutions seriously enough. As the seminal work of Robert McCloskey, Robert Dahl, and Martin Shapiro (among others) established, constitutional courts and their jurisprudence are integral elements of a larger political setting and cannot be understood in isolation from it. Taking the notion of courts as political institutions even further, recent political science scholarship suggests that judicial review is often politically constructed, and that elected officials may have political and policy reasons for empowering constitutional courts (e.g., Gillman 2002; Ginsburg 2003; Lovell 2003; Hirschl 2004a Hirschl , 2009 Graber 2006; Whittington 2007 ). Accordingly, a more strategic or realist approach to the judicialization of politics has emerged, emphasizing 'judicialization from above' and the political conditions that are likely to promote it. Concrete political power struggles, the interests of elites and other influential stakeholders, and clashes of worldviews and policy preferences are considered the main catalysts of the judicialization of mega-politics. Political conditions that are hospitable to the expansion of judicialized politics -alongside a constitutional framework that promotes the judicialization of politics and a relatively autonomous judiciary that is easily enticed to dive into deep political waters -is the explosive formula here.
In its structuralist guise, the 'realist' branch of scholarship emphasizes organic features of the political system as conducive to judicialization. For example, the judicialization of collective-identity questions may reflect constitutional disharmony caused by a polity's commitment to apparently conflicting values, such as Israel's selfdefinition as a Jewish and democratic state, or Ireland's Catholicism and EU membership (e.g., Jacobsohn 2004) . It is also more likely when the values protected in a country's constitution contrast with values prevalent among its populace. Consider Turkey's strict separation of religion and state despite the fact that the vast majority of Turks define themselves as devout Muslims. An all-encompassing judicialization of politics is, ceteris paribus, less likely in a polity featuring a unified, assertive political system that is capable of restraining the judiciary. In such polities, the political sphere may signal a credible threat to an overactive judiciary, exerting a chilling effect on the courts. Conversely, the more dysfunctional or deadlocked the political system and its decision-making institutions are in a rule-of-law polity, the greater the likelihood of expansive judicial power (Guarnieri & Pederzoli 2002, pp. 160-181) . Greater fragmentation of power among political branches reduces their ability to rein in courts and correspondingly increases the likelihood of courts asserting themselves (Ferejohn 2002) .
A more 'strategic' guise suggests that the judicialization of politics is largely a product of concrete choices, interests, or strategic considerations by self-interested political stakeholders. From the politicians' point of view, delegating policy-making authority to the courts may be an effective means of shifting responsibility and thereby reducing the risks to themselves and to the institutional apparatus within which they operate. The calculus of the 'blame deflection' strategy is quite intuitive. If the delegation of powers can increase credit or legitimacy, and/or reduce the blame placed on the politician as a result of the delegated body's policy decision, then such delegation can benefit the politician (Voigt & Salzberger 2002; Stephenson 2003) . At the very least, the transfer to the courts of contested political 'hot potatoes' offers a convenient retreat for politicians who are unwilling or unable to settle public disputes in the political sphere. Delegation also helps politicians avoid difficult or 'no win' decisions and/or the collapse of deadlocked or fragile governing coalitions (Graber 1993) . Conversely, political oppositions may seek to judicialize politics (e.g., through petitions and injunctions against government policies) in order to harass and obstruct governments (Tate & Vallinder 1995) . Opposition politicians may even resort to litigation to enhance their media exposure, regardless of the outcome of litigation (Dotan & Hofnung 2005) .
Politicians may seek public support for contentious views by relying on national high courts' public image as professional and apolitical decision-making bodies. A political quest for legitimacy often stands behind the transfer of certain regime-change questions to courts (e.g., the aforementioned Pakistani Supreme Court legitimization of the 1999 military coup d'état). Empirical studies confirm that national high courts in most constitutional democracies enjoy greater public legitimacy and support than virtually all other political institutions -even when courts engage in explicit manifestations of political jurisprudence (Gibson et al. 2003) . The judicialization of mega-politics may allow governments to impose a centralizing 'one-rule-fits-all' policy on enormous and diverse polities (Morton 1995 , Goldstein 2001 . (Following in this vein, consider the standardizing effect of apex-court jurisprudence in exceptionally diverse polities such as the United States or the European Union). Likewise, when politicians are obstructed from fully implementing their own policy agenda, they may favor the active exercise of constitutional review by a sympathetic judiciary in order to overcome those obstructions (Hirschl 2004ab; Whittington 2005 Whittington , 2007 .
The judicialization of politics may reflect the competitiveness of a polity's electoral market or governing politicians' time horizons. According to the 'party alternation' model, for example, when a ruling party expects to win elections repeatedly, the likelihood of an independent and powerful judiciary is low. When a ruling party has a low expectation of remaining in power, it is more likely to support a powerful judiciary to ensure that the next ruling party cannot use the judiciary to achieve its policy goals. Scholars draw on this 'competitiveness of the electoral market' logic to explain the variance in judicial power between Japan and the United States (Ramseyer 1994) , between different periods in the late nineteenth-century United States (Gillman 2002) , between three post-authoritarian Asian countries (Ginsburg 2003) , and between two Argentine provinces (Chavez 2003) .
The threat of losing control over pertinent policy-making processes and outcomes may be a significant driving force behind attempts to transfer contentious issues to courts.
Politicians are more likely to divert policy-making responsibility to a relatively supportive judiciary when present or prospective transformations in the political system seem to threaten their own political status and policy preferences. Influential sociopolitical groups fearful of losing their grip on political power may support the judicialization of megapolitics, the establishment of judicial review and empowerment of constitutional courts more generally, as a hegemony preserving maneuver. Such groups and their political representatives are more likely to support the judicialization of formative nation-building and collective-identity questions when their hegemony, worldviews, and their entitlement to disproportional perks and benefits are being increasingly challenged in majoritarian decision-making arenas (Hirschl 2004a) . As we have seen, the politicians' drive toward using the courts when it is politically expedient to do so is perhaps best illustrated in countries where growing popular support for principles of theocratic governance threatens the cultural propensities and policy preferences of secular-nationalist elites. It is well established in the literature that constitutionalization and the introduction of judicial review improve the international reputation and credibility of regimes (see, e.g., Moustafa 2003) . But this is only part of the picture. In countries struggling with the challenge of 'constitutional theocracy,' constitutional courts may also be viewed as the guardians of relative secularism, modernism, and universalism against increasingly popular theocratic principles. In order to govern effectively, politicians and ruling elites in predominantly religious polities must confront the challenge of constitutional theocracy while maintaining popular support for their regimes. Indeed, an increasingly common strategy for those who wield political power (and represent the groups that object to theocratic governance) is the transfer of fundamental collective-identity questions of 'religion and state' from the political sphere to the courts. Consequently, constitutional courts have become important secularizing agents in these countries (Hirschl 2004b (Hirschl , 2008 (Hirschl , 2009 . Recall the examples of the judicialization of core collective-identity questions in Egypt, Pakistan, Israel, and Turkey.
The transfer of contested 'big questions' to courts and other quasi-professional and semiautonomous policy-making bodies, domestic or supranational, may be seen as part of a broader process whereby political and economic elites, while professing support for democracy, attempt to insulate substantive policy making from the vicissitudes of democratic politics (Hirschl 2004a, pp. 211-223) John Locke's often-cited maxim "I have always thought the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts" statement provides some direction here. Perhaps the clearest illustration of the necessity of political support for judicialization is the political sphere's decisive reaction to instances of unwelcome judicial activism. To begin with, the transfer of foundational collective-identity questions to the courts seldom yields judgments that run counter to established national meta-narratives. In addition, political power holders often possess some control over the personal composition of national high courts. As a recent comparative study of judicial appointment procedures concludes, no matter how the process is constructed, it always has an important political dimension (Malleson & Russell 2006) . Consequently, the demographic characteristics, cultural propensities, and ideological tilts of supreme court judges in most countries are likely to match the rest of the political elite in these countries. As Dahl (1957, p. 291) bureaucratic disregard, or protracted or reluctant implementation (Rosenberg 1991 (Rosenberg , 1992 Garrett et al. 1998; Conant 2002 ).
Examples of the legislative override scenario in the world of new constitutionalism are plentiful. In its famous ruling in Mohammed Ahmad Kan v. Shah Bano (1985) , the Supreme Court of India held that the state-defined statutory right of a neglected wife to maintenance stood regardless of the personal law applicable to the parties (Shachar 2001, pp. 81-83) . This decision had potentially far-reaching implications for India's longstanding The harsh political reaction to, and corresponding legislative override of, the Australian High Court's expansion of Aboriginal rights is another prime example of political interference in the judicial process. In its historic ruling Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) , the High Court abandoned the legal concept of terra nullius ('vacant land') that had served for centuries as the basis for the institutional denial of Aboriginal title, established native title as a basis for proprietary rights in land, and held that Aboriginal title was not extinguished by the change in sovereignty. In Wik Peoples v. Queensland (1996) , the High Court went on to hold that leases of pastoral land by the government to private third parties did not necessarily extinguish native title. Such extinguishment depended on the specific terms of the pastoral lease and the legislation under which it was granted. The potentially far-reaching redistribution implications of Mabo II and Wik prompted an immediate popular backlash; the powerful agricultural and mining sectors, backed by the governments of Queensland, Western Australia, and the Northern Territory, demanded an across-the-board statutory extinguishment of native title. In early 1997, the conservative government under John Howard willingly bowed to the counter-court political backlash by introducing amendments to the Native Title Act that, for all intents and purposes, overrode Wik.
Responding promptly to an unfavorable ruling by the Singapore Court of Appeal concerning due process rights of political dissidents, the government of Singapore (controlled for the past four-plus decades by the People's Action Party) amended the constitution to revoke the Court's authority to exercise any meaningful judicial review over governmental powers of preventive detention (Silverstein 2003) . But it went even further. In a widely publicized ruling in 1993, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in London overturned a decision of a Singaporian district court to expel J.B.
Jeyaretnam -a leading opposition politician -from the Singapore Bar Association. Prior to its judgment in Jeyaretnam, the JCPC's status at the apex of Singapore's judicial system appeared inviolable. But as soon as the JCPC issued a ruling that was interpreted as running directly against the political interests of Singapore's ruling elite, the JCPC was denounced by government officials as "interventionist," "going outside its prescribed role," "out of touch" with local conditions, and "playing politics." Mere months after the JCPC had issued its ruling, the Singapore government passed a constitutional amendment that imposed severe restrictions on appeals to the JCPC. Constitutional Courts (Epstein et al. 2001 ) reveals that in the first Court era the docket was dominated by politically charged federalism and separation-of-powers cases, whereas the second Court resorted to the 'safe area' of individual rights jurisprudence and tended to avoid federalism issues or separation-of-powers disputes. In other words, harsh political responses to unwelcome activism or interventions on the part of the courts, or even the credible threat of such a response, can have a chilling effect on judicial decision-making patterns. Variations on the same logic explain prudent and/or strategic judicial behavior in countries as different as Argentina (Helmke 2005) , Germany (Vanberg 2005) , Pakistan (Newberg 1995) , Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (Trochev 2008) , and Japan (Ramseyer & Rasmusen 2001) . Who says supreme court judges are not shrewd political animals?
CONCLUSION: "THE WORLD IS FILLED WITH LAW" (AND WITH POLITICS TOO)
Over the past two decades, there has been a tremendous growth worldwide in the reliance on courts for dealing with some of the most fundamental political quandaries a polity can contemplate. The trend has extended well beyond the now standard judicialization of policy making through procedural justice or rights jurisprudence, to encompass megapolitics -electoral processes and outcomes, restorative justice, regime legitimacy, executive prerogatives, and foundational collective-identity issues and nation-building The crucial point in assessing the scope of this phenomenon is not, as a few observers have suggested, whether a large number of public policy matters are handled with little judicial intervention (Graber 2004 , Schauer 2006 . No doubt many are. The question is whether the courts today are significantly more involved in dealing with core political predicaments than they were, say, a generation ago. At least outside the United States, the answer, both quantitatively and qualitatively, is unequivocally in the affirmative. The proportion of policy-making areas that are insulated from judicial intervention is distinctly smaller in 2008 than it was 25 years ago. Compared to the early 1980s (roughly a generation ago), many more hitherto purely political issues are now considered primarily judicial or constitutional issues.
Of the various institutional, societal, and political factors hospitable to the judicialization of politics, three stand out as being crucial: the existence of a constitutional framework that promotes the judicialization of politics; a relatively autonomous judiciary that is easily enticed to dive into deep political waters; and, above all, a political environment that is conducive to the judicialization of politics. Lawyers and rights-seeking groups often push toward 'judicialization from below.' Certain institutional features are more hospitable than others to the expansion of judicial power. The existence of an active, nondeferential constitutional court is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for persistent judicial activism and the judicialization of mega-politics. However, the judicialization of mega-politics is first and foremost a political phenomenon. No matter how we look at it, various key issues -the secular nature of Turkey's political system, the war in Chechnya, Israel's identity as a 'Jewish and democratic state,' the transition to democracy in South Africa, the near-permanent political limbo in Pakistan, the creation of a European demos, the future of Quebec and the Canadian federation -are first and foremost political questions, not judicial ones. A political sphere conducive to the judicialization of such purely political questions is therefore at least as significant in its emergence and sustainability as the contribution of courts and judges. It is naive to assume that core political questions of this type could have been transferred to courts without at least the implicit support of influential political stakeholders.
This should come as no surprise to those who view courts as 'political' institutions.
Like any other political institution, they do not operate in an institutional or ideological vacuum. Their establishment does not develop and cannot be understood separately from the concrete social, political, and economic struggles that shape a given political system. Political deference to the judiciary and the consequent judicialization of mega-politicsindeed, the profound expansion of judicial power more generally -are an integral part and an important manifestation of those struggles. A political quest for legitimacy, or for lowering risks or costs, is often what drives deference to the judiciary, in cases involving hotly contested political issues. This insight suggests that the court-centric orthodoxy common among legal scholars may be misguided. As the examples discussed here illustrate, the portrayal of constitutional courts and judges as the major culprits in the allencompassing judicialization of politics worldwide is over-simplistic. Strategically motivated political stakeholders are at least as responsible. The judicialization-of-politics fish, to paraphrase the old saying, stinks from its head first.
Little by little, constitutional theorists start to take notice. An increasing number of public law professors (e.g., Balkin & Levinson 2001 , Friedman 2005 , Posner 2005 , Tushnet 2006 , Vermeule 2006 now pay attention to the emerging social science, most notably political science, body of scholaship that points to the institutional, attitudinal and strategic, not merely juridical, sources of judicial entanglement with high politics. This schoalrship suggests that no theory of judicial review (or grand constitutional theory more generally) is complete if it does not consider the extra-judicial determinants of judicial empowerment and behavior. It also suggests that an informed comparative research agenda concerning the political role of courts might help bridge the traditional gap between grand constitutional theory and real-life constitutional politics worldwide.
APPENDIX: MAIN CASES CITED
This article refers to more than 120 landmark constitutional court rulings from numerous jurisdictions worldwide. Below is a list of the 40 main cases.
